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INTRODUCTION 
In a remarkable moment of the 2016 presidential campaign, members 
of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement confronted presidential 
candidate Hillary Clinton about her support for the 1994 federal crime bill 
and its disastrous implications for a generation of Black Americans.1 She 
admitted the bill “went too far,” but activists were not appeased.2 BLM 
spokesperson Julius Jones pointed out that the resulting mass incarceration 
and fissures in family life were ultimately a product of “anti-blackness.”3 He 
intimated that Clinton’s capacity to lead the nation was inextricably tied to 
her willingness to reflect on her own anti-blackness and to participate in 
“chang[ing] white hearts.”4 “I don’t believe you change hearts,” Clinton 
replied. “I believe you change laws, . . . you change the way systems 
operate.”5 
In rejecting the premise of Jones’s question, Clinton was speaking not 
just for herself, but for a generation of attorneys educated in the 1960s and 
70s. The Baby Boomer bar was raised to believe that public law—the sphere 
of law that governs the relationship between citizen and sovereign as 
provided for by the Constitution and relevant statutes6—was where 
 
 1 Russell Berman, Hillary Clinton’s Blunt View of Social Progress, ATLANTIC (Aug. 22, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/hillary-clintons-blunt-view-of-social-progress/
402020/ [https://perma.cc/V4ME-R5MB]; Jessica Lussenhop, Clinton Crime Bill: Why Is It So 
Controversial?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36020717 
[https://perma.cc/A8YL-QNZZ]. 
 2 Lussenhop, supra note 1; see Watch: Full Video of Hillary Clinton’s Meeting with Black Lives 
Matter Activists, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.democracynow.org/2015/8/19/
watch_full_video_of_hillary_clintons [https://perma.cc/PA8T-R6NC] [hereinafter Clinton’s Meeting] 
(transcript). 
 3 Clinton’s Meeting, supra note 2. 
 4 See id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Randy E. Barnett provided a succinct definition of public law in his 1986 article: 
We might call laws that are meant to regulate the internal conduct of governmental authorities 
and that define their relationship or duties to private individuals ‘public law.’ In contrast, we may 
call laws that define the rights and duties that private individuals and groups owe to each other 
‘private law.’  
. . . . 
. . . Public law subjects would include constitutional law, criminal procedure, taxation, 
administrative law, and at least part of criminal law—each of which seeks to regulate the internal 
workings of government or the relationship between government and citizens. Private law 
subjects would include contract, torts, property, corporations, agency and partnership, trusts and 
estates, and remedies—subjects defining the enforceable duties that all individuals owe to one 
another. 
Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 267, 270–71 (1986). 
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Americans created civic virtue.7 It was here, they learned, that the polity 
identified constitutional rights, declared egalitarian values, and diversified 
workplaces and social spaces.8 Private law, the sphere governing the 
relationship between citizen and citizen as provided for by judge-made tort, 
contract, and property doctrines, was where individual wealth was 
distributed and transferred.9 It was, as a result, seen as public law’s 
pedestrian and complacent counterpart.  
So, when Jones asked Clinton about her stance on eradicating anti-
blackness, it is no surprise that she saw public law as the appropriate, indeed, 
the only, lever to produce the virtue he sought. But as Jones observed in 
2015, and as a cascade of Americans are acknowledging today, public law 
has so far failed to produce deep reckoning or shared civic virtue on the issue 
of race.10 
This Essay suggests that the time has come to revitalize private law—
tort law, in particular—as an engine of national virtue. The groundswell of 
activism in the summer of 2020 lends itself to particularizing this argument 
to the virtue of racial justice, but it is equally applicable to gender justice, 
economic justice, and innumerable other areas where social fracture burdens 
human flourishing. Part I summarizes the intellectual history that has led 
legal academics to treat public law as the only legal intervention applicable 
 
 7 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the 
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1, 3–4 (1984) (tracing the “era of the public lawsuit” to 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and explaining that many public law litigants have 
not personally experienced the breach of a legal duty owed to them, but instead “represent shared interests 
in enforcing lawful conduct by large institutions [and therefore] initiate legal action to redress legal 
wrongs that offend their moral or ideological sense of right”). 
 8 Cf. id. at 2 n.3. 
 9 See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HAST. L.J. 105, 112 (2008) 
(contending that the economists whose views were ascendant during this period, see infra notes 35–37, 
saw the goal of private law as “aggregate wealth maximization” rather than “the pursuit of social justice”). 
 10 The uneven success of public law is evident across a range of racially disparate public and private 
systems, including public education, policing, geographic segregation, and home ownership. See, e.g., 
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, BROWN V. BOARD AT 60: WHY HAVE WE BEEN SO DISAPPOINTED? WHAT HAVE 
WE LEARNED?, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1 (2014), https://files.epi.org/2014/EPI-Brown-v-Board-04-17-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S5S-JJMF] (explaining that “Brown was unsuccessful in its purported 
mission—to undo the school segregation that persists as a central feature of American public education 
today”); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3192–93, 
3207 (2014) (observing that although Congress passed a federal statute giving the Attorney General 
power to initiate structural reforms of local police departments in the wake of the Rodney King beating, 
the power has not been “effectively used”); Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The Forty-Year “First Step”: The 
Fair Housing Act as an Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1618–19, 
1618 n.4, 1640–47 (2007) (explaining that although Congress passed the Fair Housing Act to bring about 
“truly integrated and balanced living patterns” by, among other things, proscribing “many of the 
discriminatory practices that contribute to the contemporary perpetuation of segregated communities,” 
distinct racial enclaves remain, thanks in part to judicial reluctance to treat realtor race-based “steering” 
as violations of the Act). 
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to social ills like racism. Part II surveys how disciplines outside law 
understand the component parts of racism and the most effective responses 
to them, including mechanisms that position Black people as storytellers and 
white people as listeners. It then demonstrates that tort litigation facilitates 
these processes and thus produces a distinct kind of virtue that is a crucial 
complement to the systemic reforms at the heart of public law. Part III shows 
these processes at work in the iconic battery case of Fisher v. Carrousel 
Motor Hotel, Inc.11 Finally, the conclusion reminds us that Professor 
Marshall Shapo’s entire body of work can be understood as a commitment 
to tort’s virtue-production capacity. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW EXCEPTIONALISM 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, observers came to describe 
law as occupying two spheres: the “private” and the “public.”12 Private law 
was originally thought to identify and protect individual rights to own, to 
repel intrusions on ownership, and to exchange things owned, whereas public 
law empowered government limits on those rights.13 The apotheosis of the 
private law era was the Lochner case,14 in which the Supreme Court assumed 
that private parties were amply equipped to arrange their own social and 
economic relationships without government intervention.15 Indeed, the 
Lochner Court conceptualized constitutional rights as a weapon against 
public efforts to equalize power imbalances.16 
The reaction to Lochner, of course, contributed to the end of private law 
dominance. The Justices had inadvertently revealed that they were implicitly 
biased in favor of those who controlled the private marketplace.17 This made 
clear to members of the rising intellectual school known as Legal Realism 
that ostensibly neutral common law rules were actually “a set of policy-
driven results,” often favoring the moneyed elite.18 
As private law waned, public law increasingly captured the academic 
imagination. Throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
 
 11 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967). 
 12 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the 
Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 885–86 (1991). 
 13 Id. at 886. 
 14 See Neal Devins, The Interactive Constitution: An Essay on Clothing Emperors and Searching for 
Constitutional Truth, 85 GEO. L.J. 691, 693–94 (1997) (reviewing LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK 
V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF (1996)). 
 15 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905). 
 16 See Devins, supra note 14, at 693. 
 17 See id. at 693–94. 
 18 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a 
Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 712–13 (1991). 
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positioned itself as a governmental forum receptive to identity-based social 
movements advocating race and gender parity.19 Early in the century, the 
Court issued a number of opinions compelling profound changes in the 
substantive organization of American life.20 Scholars initially responded to 
these groundbreaking and controversial pronouncements not by valorizing 
their substantive content, but by celebrating the infrastructure that produced 
them.21 The so-called legal process approach suggested that the unique 
competency of public law “lay not in fundamental agreement about 
substantive principles, but instead in the open structures and procedures of 
government, the process by which we can govern ourselves notwithstanding 
disagreements.”22 On this theory, so long as an outcome resulted from the 
application of neutral interpretive principles, it was virtuous, regardless of 
how it affected lives on the ground. 
However, when the Supreme Court declared segregated schools 
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education,23 those who adhered to the 
process approach observed that the decision did not—and arguably could 
not—satisfy their test of legitimacy. Writing in 1959, legal process scion 
Herbert Wechsler praised the Brown result, but damned the rationale that 
produced it.24 He argued that because desegregation was not compelled by 
any neutral constitutional principle, the Court’s action reflected a pure policy 
preference.25 “Legal process . . . could never quite explain Brown, except as 
a case uniquely compelled by unusual circumstances,”26 and that difficulty 
weakened academic loyalty to the process school. By the 1970s, progressive 
process scholars “found it impossible to remain true to legal process’ 
purposivism without keeping one eye on substance.”27 A decade later, 
inspired by Brown, many came to think of constitutional litigation as “the 
social process by which judges give meaning to our public values.”28 
 
 19 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional 
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2064–67 (2002). 
 20 See Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165, 2170–74 (1999) 
(citations omitted) (noting the popular narrative that the Supreme Court shifted in 1937 from a “free 
market” orientation and a “‘war on the liberal welfare state’” to an embrace of “the constitutional 
legitimacy of the New Deal vision of activist government”). 
 21 Eskridge & Peller, supra note 18, at 709–10. 
 22 Id. at 716 (emphasis omitted). 
 23 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 24 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–
34 (1959). 
 25 See id. at 34. 
 26 Eskridge & Peller, supra note 18, at 735. 
 27 Id. at 724. 
 28 Id. at 736 (citing Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term — Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979)). 
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Lawyers educated during this period were exposed to the belief that law 
was “responsible for doing something about the substantive ills of our 
society,” via legislation and, more importantly, “by the enforcement of 
constitutional ‘rights.’”29 Put bluntly, by the 1960s, “the Warren Court [was], 
for [the] generation growing up in law school in that period . . . a heroic 
institution” because it actively advanced “civil rights and civil liberties.”30 
As public law was rising in the academic firmament, private law 
continued to shrink.31 This downgrade was a product of both its jural 
structure and its doctrinal substance. The bipolar framework of private law 
litigation pitted two unsung parties against each other, neither of whom 
wielded the state power thought necessary for social change.32 And even 
within tort—the one body of private law explicitly designed to identify and 
redress interpersonal wrongs—isolating an incident of wrongdoing between 
two people was not treated as a springboard for reform. If the defendant were 
ordered to remediate his wrong, that remedy would ordinarily be 
personalized to a single party’s past losses, not expanded to prevent future 
injuries to similarly situated persons.33 Consequently, next to public law’s 
“tremendous ability . . . to sweep away power centers,”34 private law seemed 
embarrassingly small. 
Compounding tort’s perceived structural irrelevance to the social 
justice project was the rise of scholarship contending that the primary 
substantive goal of tort doctrine was to optimally allocate wealth, rather than 
to facilitate systemic change.35 For the latter half of the twentieth century, 
 
 29 Eskridge & Peller, supra note 18, at 748, 756. 
 30 Rethinking Rights After World War II, COMMON LAW (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.law.
virginia.edu/commonlaw/show-notes-rethinking-rights-after-world-war-ii [https://perma.cc/SPY4-
PXZH] (transcript of interview with legal historian G. Edward White). 
 31 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–
83 (1976). 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id.; see also Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 424 (1992) (observing 
that, in Aristotle’s view of private law, the individual plaintiff and defendant are distinctively “link[ed]”). 
Notably, during the 1990s and early 2000s personal injury attorneys attempted to mimic the practice of 
the social impact litigation of the 1960s and 1970s by bringing class action tort lawsuits that sought money 
damages for mass torts. See Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative 
Strategy Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DEPAUL. L. REV. 493, 496–99 
(2001). More recently, attorneys have been bringing so-called “social policy tort” class actions to achieve 
“changes in institutional policies and practices” among defendants such as cigarette companies and gun 
manufacturers. See id. at 499–501. 
 34 Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 477, 
484 (2000). 
 35 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26–31 (1970); Richard A. Posner, A 
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33–34, 75 (1972); R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 
3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6 (1960). 
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just as constitutional law was being drawn larger in scope, tort law was being 
reconceptualized to do a single job: “bring[] about an efficient allocation of 
resources to safety and care.”36 Tort, in other words, was being reduced to a 
quasi-regulatory instrument of market efficiency. By the end of the century, 
the law and economics version of tort was the “dominant tort theory” in U.S. 
law schools.37 
Throughout this period a minority of corrective justice scholars 
consistently argued against a market-centered version of tort, but even they 
did not position it as a mechanism for influencing social systems.38 They 
insisted that the purview of tort was to “hold[] people responsible . . . for 
their wrongdoing.”39 This philosophical account of tort was geared toward 
something called “justice,” but it was an altogether smaller and less 
impactful kind of justice than the racial, gender, and economic equality 
pursued by public lawyers. 
The gulf between the intellectual ambitions of public law and its private 
counterpart have, in some ways, hardened into a modern assumption that the 
public sphere of the law is “superior” to the private one.40 Acolytes praise 
public law for demanding that “citizens rise above their merely private 
concerns to join in a public dialogue to define the common good,” thus 
“mak[ing] the citizenry more virtuous by modifying existing individual 
preferences.”41 Indeed, public law has been called a “site for the production 
of a ruling ideology about the necessity for the existing arrangements in 
social life.”42 Private law, a forum for mere individuals seeking one-off, 
backward-looking remedies, has been dismissed as unequal to the virtue 
production task.43 
II. SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES AND HEARTS AND MINDS 
The transcript of Julius Jones’s conversation with Hillary Clinton 
shows two people talking past each other about how to produce racial virtue 
 
 36 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. 
REV. 851, 855 (1981). 
 37 See Jules Coleman, Scott Hershovitz, & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of the Common Law of Torts, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Winter 2015 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/tort-
theories/ [https://perma.cc/57SL-UAT2]. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. 
 40 Farber & Frickey, supra note 12, at 879. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Eskridge & Peller, supra note 18, at 775. 
 43 See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1056–58 (2004) (explaining why Chayes disdained the power of 
private law relative to public law and critiquing the legitimacy of Chayes’s conclusions). 
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in the United States. Jones repeatedly asked Clinton to self-reflect about her 
role in creating laws that have decimated the Black community and to 
consider how a white worldview has perpetuated anti-Black systems.44 
Clinton repeatedly voiced her faith that systems created by legislation and 
litigation could address racial inequities.45 They seemed to lack a shared 
vocabulary to discuss government’s role in changing hearts and minds. This 
Part suggests that the nexus between government action and personal 
reflection capable of bridging their divide may be found within private law. 
A. The Duality of Racism, the Duality of Law 
Social psychologists have identified an “interplay” of factors 
responsible for U.S. racism, which can be roughly grouped into the 
sociopolitical and the psychological.46 Sociopolitical factors include macro- 
and micro-segregation, racialized social hierarchies, racialized power 
structures, and misrepresentations of racial minorities in U.S. media.47 
Psychological factors include the use of category thinking, group factions, 
and “most insidious[ly],” passivism, which takes the form of denial and 
apathy about racial inequality in the country.48 
The parallels between racism’s dual causes and law’s dual spheres is 
unmistakable. Sociopolitical causes of racism are external to individuals; 
they reflect choices made by the polity about allocating public power, 
spending public money, and constructing public spaces. Psychological 
 
 44 Jones asked Clinton: 
[W]hat in your heart has changed that’s going to change the direction in this country? Like, what 
in you—like, not your platform, not what you’re supposed to say—like, how do you actually feel 
that’s different than you did before? Like, what were the mistakes? And how can those mistakes 
that you made be lessons for all of America for a moment of reflection on how we treat black 
people in this country? 
Clinton’s Meeting, supra note 2. When Clinton encouraged him to provide her with a legislative agenda to 
address the problem, he called that approach “victim blaming” because it indicated that “what the Black Lives 
Matter movement . . . needs to do to change white hearts is to come up with a policy change.” Id. 
 45 Clinton replied: 
I think that there has to be a reckoning. I agree with that. But I also think there has to be some 
positive vision and plan that you can move people toward. Once you say, ‘You know, this country 
has still not recovered from its original sin’—which is true—once you say that, then the next 
question, by people who are on the sidelines, which is the vast majority of Americans—the next 
question is: ‘Well, so, what do you want me to do about it? What am I supposed to do about it?’ 
That’s what I’m trying to put together in a way that I can explain it and I can sell it, because in 
politics, if you can’t explain it and you can’t sell it, it stays on the shelf. 
Id. 
 46 Steven O. Roberts & Michael T. Rizzo, The Psychology of American Racism, AM. PSYCH., June 
2020, at 2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/amp0000642 [https://perma.cc/5V4D-CP7U]. 
 47 See id. at 4–8. 
 48 Id. at 2–4, 9. 
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causes are internal to individuals; they involve choices made privately about 
contextualizing information, experiencing intimacy, and expending energy. 
Obviously, the internal and the external are symbiotic; individuals who lack 
personal context, exposure, and experience with other races may be more 
likely to prefer or tolerate racist systems; and the persistence of racist 
systems perpetuates the likelihood that individuals will live siloed lives that 
reinforce their psychological prejudices. Public law has obvious competency 
to address sociopolitical factors and to intervene in favor of “equitable laws, 
policies, and institutions,”49 but it has little competency to address 
psychological factors or to intervene in favor of the “equitable thoughts, 
feelings, and actions,”50 without which systemic change is bound to fail.51 
Perhaps because of the modern tendency to equate tort with market 
regulation, the competency of personal injury law to conduct that 
intervention has not been seriously evaluated. The remainder of this Part 
does so, drawing on theories of democratic accountability that involve 
personal storytelling and compelled listening, and suggesting that jury 
service is the single political site where such exchanges take place.52 
B. Listening as a Method of Democratic Accountability 
Political scientists have suggested that mutual accountability among all 
members of a society “is a critical democratic practice.”53 At the same time, 
they have observed that white people are rarely held accountable for racism 
because they claim to be ignorant of it.54 Researchers attribute this 
“ignorance” to a government and culture that have adopted a “white gaze” 
 
 49 Id. at 9–10. 
 50 Id. at 9.  
 51 For example, a number of white communities in Jefferson County, Alabama evaded a 1969 court 
order to desegregate by seceding from the county school district, and observing that they described their 
motivation race-neutrally as a quest for “local control,” thereby “provid[ing] cover for their efforts to 
preserve the whiteness of their schools.” Nikole Hannah-Jones, The Resegregation of Jefferson County, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG.(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/magazine/the-resegregation-of-
jefferson-county.html [https://perma.cc/97YD-63HF] (explaining how Hannah-Jones attributed the 
success of the tactic to the willingness of “[m]ost white Americans . . . to ignore stark segregation and 
racial disparity as long as it came wrapped in so-called colorblind policy.” Id. 
 52 Skepticism about tort’s virtue-production capacity may be aggravated by critical legal theory 
scholarship identifying aspects of doctrine that perpetuate systemic inequities. Doctrine that denies 
nonphysical injuries, adopts limited definitions of “reasonableness,” and uses income probabilities to 
calculate damages all tend to disadvantage women and people of color. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An 
Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575, 578, 580, 586 (1993); Martha 
Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 464 (1998). 
My argument that civil adjudication of tort claims may disrupt white passivity should not be understood 
to underestimate the extent to which tort doctrine is itself a system in need of scrutiny and reform. 
 53 See Vincent Jungkunz & Julie White, Ignorance, Innocence, and Democratic Responsibility: 
Seeing Race, Hearing Racism, 75 J. POL. 436, 436 (2013). 
 54 Id. at 436, 438. 
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which “naturalize[s] and stabilize[s] racial ordering,” for example, seeing 
“the black body in white space as threat, the white body in black space as 
threatened.”55 The reality of this ordering belies the ostensible promise of the 
Constitution to produce fairness and equality for all citizens. As one scholar 
has summarized, “[t]he high visibility of the structures of democracy masks 
totalitarian undercurrents and offers those who prefer not to see an alibi for 
their blindness. In the real[ity] of race relations this motivated blindness has 
produced what we may call a ‘non-racist racism.’”56 
Scholars working in this space have observed that moral accountability 
for social dynamics may remain dormant so long as moral agents are 
responding to their “vision” of the social world.57 Seeing has been described 
as a passive act which leads the viewer to impart an unwarranted “givenness 
and stability” to what is seen.58 One way to reorient white perspectives on 
the social world, they have suggested, is to shift away from potentially 
deceptive “seeing” and towards mediated storytelling.59 This technique is 
effective because unlike observation—conducted autonomously and 
uncritically—storytelling can establish a collaboration between speaker and 
listener.60 In this collaboration, speakers craft narratives that carry moral 
judgments about the world they inhabit.61 Listeners, in turn, are alerted to 
“social relationships and relevant identities” that they may not have 
perceived without prompting.62 The listener is thus made aware of blind spots 
that may have obscured her vision of the world and is compelled to encounter 
uncomfortable realities the storyteller chooses to highlight.63 
Notably, the storytelling model of democratic accountability requires 
both facilitating minority narratives and compelling majority engagement 
with those narratives.64 Unlike dialogue, a communicative mode that tends 
to treat minority narratives as “reason-giving” accounts subject to debate,65 
storytelling centers on the authenticity of the narrator’s experience. Narrators 
“articulate[] the different worlds blacks see, and . . . put[] open to 
 
 55 Id. at 436–37. 
 56 Id. at 441 (emphasis omitted) (quoting John Fiske, Surveilling the City: Whiteness, the Black Man 
and Democratic Totalitarianism, 15 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 67, 70 (1998)). 
 57 Jungkunz & White, supra note 53, at 442. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. at 442–43. 
 60 See id. at 443. 
 61 See id. at 442. 
 62 Id. at 442. 
 63 See id. at 443. 
 64 See id. at 445. 
 65 Id. at 447. 
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contestation the objective and official visions produced by the white gaze.”66 
This model is dependent upon what is known as “silent yielding” by white 
listeners.67 “[S]ilent yielding is a temporary transition point in which a 
historically privileged speaker yields the floor in order to better understand 
fellow citizens and allow for the inclusion of previously excluded voices” to 
influence his understanding of the world.68 While listeners are compelled to 
be silent, their listening is “active,” and can be “transformative.”69 
Though storytelling and silent yielding are potent interventions against 
the psychological passivism and category thinking that contributes to racism, 
white Americans are rarely asked or required to participate in this mode of 
communication. Further, sociopolitical realities reduce the likelihood that 
they will informally encounter or seek out such opportunities. As one scholar 
has summarized, pervasive segregation “results in racialized pools of 
knowledge,” meaning that “[w]hite people typically do not have access 
to . . . racialized conversations” about the experience of segregation and 
discrimination and “have fewer incentives to be race-conscious.”70 
Government does little to counter this dynamic. Indeed, one democratic 
theorist has noted “the virtual absence of an explicit normative commitment 
to listening in the work in democratic theory.”71 Political institutions “foster 
the articulation of interests but . . . slight the difficult art of listening.”72 
 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 448. 
 69 Id. at 449. 
 70 Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1120–24 (2008). The 
extent of majority exposure to and engagement with such conversation is dynamic over time. For 
example, surveys indicate that as BLM demonstrators and other activists mounted sustained protests 
against police brutality and the pervasive presence of anti-blackness in the country in 2020, many white 
citizens have sought out and attempted to act on such information. See, e.g., Kim Parker, Juliana Horowitz 
& Monica Anderson, Amid Protests, Majorities Across Racial and Ethnic Groups Express Support for 
the Black Lives Matter Movement, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2020), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/06/12/amid-protests-majorities-across-racial-and-ethnic-groups-
express-support-for-the-black-lives-matter-movement/ [https://perma.cc/QB5G-3GCF] (finding that 
69% of Americans had talked with friends or family about race in the month following the 
demonstrations, 37% had used social networking sites to engage with content concerning race or racial 
equality, and about 10% had contributed money to advance the cause of racial equality). Although this 
phenomenon appears to be gaining traction in the present moment, it remains impossible to know whether 
such momentum will rise or fall in the future. 
 71 Jungkunz & White, supra note 53, at 437 n.2 (citing SUSAN BICKFORD, THE DISSONANCE OF 
DEMOCRACY: LISTENING, CONFLICT AND CITIZENSHIP (1996)). 
 72 Id. at 447 (quoting BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 174–75 (2003)) (noting “[t]he 
liberal reduction of talk to speech”). 
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C. The Jury as a Site of Compelled Listening 
The one political institution in the United States explicitly designed to 
facilitate joint listening is the jury.73 Jurors are “compelled to appear, listen, 
and perform” as the arbiters of interpersonal disputes.74 The institutional 
practice of jury service is essentially one of government-mandated listening. 
Where the plaintiff is claiming a race-based injury, the government is 
directing majority jurors to “yield[] the floor” and hear a “previously 
excluded voice[]” discuss how racialized aggression or neglect has caused 
her personal harm.75  
Jurors each bring to this practice highly personal schemas, or 
“individual knowledge structures that have been shaped by past experiences 
and that define how a person expects the world to operate.”76 In order to 
persuade jurors to render verdicts based on the specifics of the personal 
conflict involved in a given case rather than on their category-level 
understandings of the world at large, lawyers must challenge “not only the 
jurors’ self-perceptions but also jurors’ perceptions of society, culture, and 
institutions.”77 Doing so “create[s] space for chang[e] . . . and may provide 
the impetus for re-examining previously held beliefs.”78 
Understood in this fashion, the conduct of a personal injury trial maps 
perfectly onto the model of testimonial narrative and silent yielding that 
democratic theorists have identified as an effective mechanism for surfacing 
and stripping away white racial passivity.79 This is especially true in cases 
where Black plaintiffs claim personal injuries arising from anti-Black and 
racist behaviors. Further, it stands in stark contrast to the way public law 
litigation typically unfolds. 
 
 73 See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term — Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 32 (2010) (conceptualizing juries as “democratic decisionmakers,” 
producing microcosmic views on disputed issues through “face-to-face interactions unmediated by 
political parties or electoral politics”). 
 74 Danielle R. Cover, Of Courtrooms and Classrooms, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 291, 307–08 (2018). 
 75 See Jungkunz & White, supra note 53, at 448. Within private law, tort’s explicit concern with 
wrong identification and injury compensation and its delegation of social norm identification to the jury, 
positions it as the primary site for mediated storytelling about the personal harms that result from racial, 
gender, and economic inequalities. Property and contract, with their emphasis on clarifying claims to 
ownership and coordinating wealth transfers, do not have at their center a concern with interpersonal care 
or the duty to avoid injuring and are therefore less likely to call for the kind of storytelling that can produce 
racial awareness. This is not to say that aspects of property and contract doctrine have not influenced, or 
been influenced by, the realities of race inequality in the United States. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1, 20–23 (1948) (finding racially restrictive covenants that inhibited Black homeownership 
unenforceable). 
 76 Cover, supra note 74, at 315. 
 77 Id. at 311. 
 78 Id. at 316. 
 79 See Jungkunz & White, supra note 53, at 448–49. 
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Recall that public law litigation was originally lionized for its 
multiplicity of parties and capacity to produce broad remedies in response to 
the documented impact of flawed systems.80 Those characteristics position it 
to address the sociopolitical components of racism but may simultaneously 
prevent it from addressing the psychological problems of passivism and 
category thinking. Take, for example, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,81 a case 
in which a twenty-four-year-old Black motorist was pulled over by Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers and, despite his cooperation, 
placed in a chokehold that rendered him unconscious and damaged his 
larynx.82 The plaintiff asked the court to issue a permanent injunction barring 
LAPD members from using the chokehold in the future.83 He supported his 
request for injunctive relief with “affidavits, depositions, and government 
records” that showed that 75% of those who had died in department 
chokeholds over the past eight years were Black men.84 Nevertheless, the 
district court granted the city’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings 
in the first instance, and the Supreme Court ultimately called the plaintiff’s 
fear that he was likely to be stopped and choked in the future merely 
“speculat[ive].”85 The citywide statistical record was apparently insufficient 
to persuade the white majority of the Court that Lyons and other Black men 
were routinely and predictably abused during traffic stops regardless of their 
compliance. 
In contrast, jurors in private law tort cases involving racially inflected 
harms are asked to assemble in groups of twelve or fewer to listen at length 
to a precise and unfiltered narrative from the actual person who suffered 
harm. Tort is not designed to center on composite statistical presentations, 
but rather to center on one person’s story of her own injury. Jurors are 
explicitly invited to condemn the behavior that produced the injury if it is 
incompatible with community values.86 Consequently, political science 
 
 80 Indeed, the 1966 revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governing class action litigation 
was designed “to facilitate civil rights litigation,” and was deployed to secure judicially imposed plans to 
“desegregate schools, reform prison conditions, and expand welfare rights.” Hensler, supra note 33, at 
499. 
 81 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
 82 Id. at 97–98; id. at 114–15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 83 Id. at 98. 
 84 Id. at 115, 116 nn.3–4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 85 Id. at 98–99, 108. 
 86 Notably, Lyons brought both public and private claims in his case. The first four counts of his 
complaint sought individual damages from the officers and the City. Id. at 98. Midway through the 
litigation, the parties agreed to sever Lyons’s damages claim from his structural claim, and the fate of the 
former is unclear. Id. at n.6. Though his quest for structural reform of the LAPD foundered because his 
statistical presentation was impotent against jurists’ motivated blindness, one can imagine that his quest 
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research suggests that tort litigation may intervene against the “built-in 
blindness[]”87 to racism that can doom systemic reform in a way that public 
law cannot, and may be understood as an expression of community norms. 
In other words, the smallness that has been depicted as tort’s Achilles heel 
may actually be its hidden strength. 
III. SILENT YIELDING IN ACTION 
The iconic Texas tort case of Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel88 
illustrates the power of silent yielding to produce meaningful interpersonal 
change on the ground. The case was brought by a Black National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) employee who was denied 
service at a professional luncheon in Houston.89 As explained below, Fisher’s 
case was tried to a local jury at a unique moment in the city’s history. 
Houston civic leaders at the time were making sociopolitical changes to 
integrate public spaces, but Houston residents appeared psychologically 
resistant to that initiative. Consequently, the case functions as a test of tort’s 
capacity to activate the private transformation of “thoughts, feelings, and 
actions”90 that appears to be inextricable from the success of structural 
change. 
Fisher’s victory was counterintuitive for several reasons. As a matter of 
doctrine, Texas law did not seem to recognize what happened to him as a 
compensable wrong. In his complaint, Fisher claimed that the hotel manager 
assaulted him, but Texas precedent conditioned assault liability on a 
defendant’s use of a “threatening gesture”91 or words indicating an intent to 
batter the plaintiff, and the manager removed the plate from his grasp without 
making any violent gestures or verbal threats.92 The Texas Supreme Court 
ultimately revived Fisher’s award by restyling it as a battery, but in doing so, 
it cited to no Texas Supreme Court case construing the “contact” element of 
 
for individual vindication may have flourished because his compelling personal narrative of a gratuitous 
traffic stop, a demeaning and violent physical assault, and a casual dismissal at the close of the encounter 
penetrated juror consciousness. 
 87 See Jungkunz & White, supra note 53, at 436–37. 
 88 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967). 
 89 Id. at 628–29. 
 90 Roberts & Rizzo, supra note 46, at 2. Of course, silent yielding does not flourish or produce anti-
racist results in every tort cause of action, and untransformed juror bias can actually produce racist 
verdicts. See, e.g., Jonathan Cardi, Valerie P. Hans & Gregory Parks, Do Black Injuries Matter?: Implicit 
Bias and Jury Decision Making in Tort Cases, 93 S. CALIF. L. REV. 507, 507 (2020) (suggesting that 
juror implicit bias can influence the assignment of responsibility and the size of plaintiff damage awards). 
Fisher is an example of tort adjudication at its best. 
 91 Texas Bus Lines v. Anderson, 233 S.W.2d 961, 964 (Tex. App. 1950). 
  92 Fisher, 424 S.W.2d at 628–29; see also text accompanying notes 97–103 (providing an overview 
of the altercation described). 
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that tort broadly enough to be satisfied by the touching of an item in the 
plaintiff’s hand.93 So his victory at trial, and eventual victory in the state high 
court, were by no means foreordained. What follows is exercise in “legal 
archaeology,” a kind of legal history that attempts to “study . . . an individual 
case by reconstructing its historical, economic, and social context.”94 This 
kind of study relies on evidence “outside the law library”95 to “recover 
alternative, ‘unofficial’ accounts of the dispute.”96 
A. The Injury 
In November of 1963, two Houston technology companies invited a 
Black NASA mathematician, Emmit Fisher, to attend a professional 
conference where they were promoting equipment they hoped NASA might 
purchase.97 Midway through the conference, held at the local Carrousel 
Motor Hotel, the thirty attendees broke for a buffet luncheon in the hotel 
restaurant, the Brass Ring Club.98 When Fisher took a plate and joined the 
 
 93 Id. at 629. The Texas Supreme Court upheld the jury award and redefined the manager’s conduct 
as a battery, observing that “[p]ersonal indignity is the essence of an action for battery.” Id. at 630. But it 
conspicuously failed to cite any of its own cases for the proposition that “contact” should be construed so 
flexibly. Instead, it cited WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 32 (3d ed. 1964), a 1941 Mississippi 
Supreme Court case, and a 1932 Texas appellate court case. Id. at 629. This judicial activism on Fisher’s 
behalf is one of the remarkable things about the case. See Lisa R. Pruitt, Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 
(Tex. 1993), Draft Commentary, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: TORTS OPINIONS REWRITTEN (Feb. 5, 2020 
draft) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (“Though I have taught Fisher for two decades, I remain 
surprised that the Texas Supreme Court in 1967 found a way to support the claim of an African-American 
man, even when doing so required stretching existing law to carve out a new doctrinal space for his 
claim.”). The Texas court may have slotted the manager’s behavior as battery in part to avoid invoking 
the tort that was arguably the best description of the interaction: intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(IIED). The justices noted that they had refused to recognize that “new tort” in 1953 and that they could 
compensate Fisher without reversing course on IIED by recasting the interaction as a battery. See Fisher, 
424 S.W.2d at 630. Texas did not recognize the IIED tort until 1993, in Twyman v. Twyman. 855 S.W.2d 
619, 620 (Tex. 1993). Notably, IIED, also known as outrage, has been disdained by many judges and 
scholars for being unduly “subjective.” See Cristina Carmody Tilley, The Tort of Outrage and Some 
Objectivity About Subjectivity, 12 J. TORT L. 283, 284 (2019). On examination, outrage skepticism seems 
to be animated by the possibility that women and people of color will claim injuries arising from social 
dynamics favorable to—and ostensibly unrecognized by—members of dominant communities. See id. at 
328–30. In such cases, jurors are asked to affirm the realness of either the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s 
life. See id. This is why IIED cases are arguably the most fitting forum for the kind of “mediated 
storytelling” contemplated herein to address “motivated blindness.” See supra Part II.B. It may also be 
why it is considered disfavored in some sectors of the legal establishment. Tilley, supra, at 284. 
 94 Debora L. Threedy, Legal Archaeology: Excavating Cases, Reconstructing Context, 80 TUL. L. 
REV. 1197, 1197–98 (2006). 
 95 Id. at 1198 (quoting A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 12 (1995)). 
 96 Id. at 1197. 
 97 Fisher, 424 S.W.2d at 628; Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition at 1, Fisher v. Carrousel 
Motor Hotel, Harris County Dist. Ct. No. 635699 (filed Sep. 11, 1964); Negro Wins $900 Award from 
Court, HOUS. POST (on file with author). 
 98 Fisher, 424 S.W.2d at 628. 
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line, the club manager immediately approached him, “snatched the plate 
from [his] hand and shouted that he, a Negro, could not be served.”99 
Although Fisher’s corporate hosts interceded on his behalf, the manager 
stood fast and Fisher returned to the afternoon session of the conference 
without having eaten.100 Fisher sued the manager and the hotel for assault.101 
But when he was asked whether he was “forced” to leave the club by being 
“take[n] by the arm and le[d] out or push[ed] . . . out,” Fisher explained: 
“bodily, no, he didn't push me out . . . [h]e didn’t grab me and throw me 
out.”102 Despite the lack of physical contact or threats of contact, Fisher 
testified that “he was highly embarrassed and hurt by [the manager’s] 
conduct in the presence of his associates.”103 
B. The Public City 
The significance of Fisher as a test of tort’s virtue-production capacity 
fully emerges when the case is placed in historical context. Houston was 
founded in 1837 with the explicit goal of creating a transportation hub that 
would serve as a “commercial emporium [for] all Texas.”104 A century later, 
Houston was known locally as a “bustling oil town” but had no national 
profile.105 So when NASA decided in 1961 to build its Manned Spacecraft 
Center in Houston, and President John F. Kennedy gave a speech there, it 
effectively “put [the city] on the map.”106 With NASA’s arrival, Houston 
“shed its roughneck image” and “raised [its] international profile among the 
movers and shakers of the world.”107 
NASA’s elevation of Houston’s economic and cultural position in the 
country coincided with the intensification of civil rights activism in the city. 
Although Houston was “home of the South’s largest black community,” 
 
 99 Id. at 628–29. 
 100 Negro Wins $900 Award from Court, supra note 97. 
 101 Fisher, 424 S.W.2d at 628. 
 102 Trial Transcript at 14, Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Harris County Dist. Ct. No. 635699 (June 
14, 1966). 
 103 Fisher, 424 S.W.2d at 629. 
 104 Betty Trapp Chapman, A System of Government Where Business Ruled, 8 HOUS. HIST. 30, 30 
(2010). 
 105 Roy S. Estess, Opinion, From JSC: Here’s to 40 More Years, Houston, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 24, 
2001, 5:30 AM), https://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/From-JSC-Here-s-to-40-more-years-
Houston-2052220.php [https://perma.cc/WM7H-985J]. 
 106 Alex Stuckey, Mission Moon: How 50 Years of Space Exploration Defined Houston, HOUS. 
CHRON., July 21, 2019, at A9. 
 107 Jeannie Kever, The NASA Impact: Forty Years Ago the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration Was Born, and Houston Hasn’t Been the Same Since, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 25, 1998, at 6. 
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white Houston had strictly enforced racial separation for nearly a century.108 
The announcement of Brown in 1954 did little to immediately change daily 
life in Houston. Indeed, the leaders of the city school district hoped to 
maintain a “separate but equal” system “well into the 1960s despite 
Brown.”109 
In the face of city resistance to Brown’s directive and message, Black 
students at segregated Texas Southern University launched Houston’s sit-in 
movement in March 1960.110 As the students applied public pressure, older 
“black leaders had quietly begun closed-door meetings with the white 
establishment, which feared that civil strife would be bad for the city’s 
image.”111 By September of 1960, seventy Houston lunch counters had been 
desegregated.112 Still, business leaders would not integrate movie theaters 
and restaurants, and student protests continued.113 In 1962, city hotels were 
desegregated.114 The movement culminated in May 1963 when students 
threatened to disrupt a parade celebrating the NASA Mercury space 
mission.115 Fearing that the city’s reputation as a booming, modern 
metropolis would be tarnished on national television, city leaders agreed to 
desegregate those institutions as well.116 
C. The Private City 
While these initiatives dismantled some of Houston’s public signifiers 
of race inequality, they did little to change Houstonians’ private approach to 
race inequality. A well-established network of private social clubs meant that 
white Houstonians could continue socializing and networking in segregated 
spaces. As explained by Mary Beth Rogers: 
 
 108 Zan Dubin, Chronicling the Quiet Desegregation of Houston, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 1998, 12:00 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-feb-11-ca-17755-story.html [https://perma.cc/
MPX8-NJJW]. In 1876, the Texas constitution created a segregated public school system, and the state 
legislature segregated intrastate rail travel in 1891. TYINA L. STEPTOE, HOUSTON BOUND: CULTURE AND 
COLOR IN A JIM CROW CITY 29–30 (2016). City ordinances adopted in the early 1900s “prohibited 
integration in every space where black and white people made contact . . . . [In 1907,] the city council 
segregated theaters, hotels, restaurants, and public facilities.” Id. 
 109 Andrew Joseph Pegoda, The University of Houston and Texas Southern University: Perpetuating 
“Separate But Equal” in the Face of Brown v. Board of Education, 8 HOUS. HIST. 19, 19 (2010). 
 110 Dubin, supra note 108. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 THOMAS R. COLE, NO COLOR IS MY KIND: THE LIFE OF ELDREWEY STEARNS AND THE 
INTEGRATION OF HOUSTON 78–79 (1997). 
 115 Dubin, supra note 108. 
 116 See id. 
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No prominent business leader in Houston wanted to let anything happen to 
disrupt the economic boom. So if Houston’s black people wanted to eat at a 
dime-store lunch counter downtown, let them! The integration of a few 
restaurants or public facilities did not matter to the city’s white leaders, since 
most of their important business and social affairs took place in private, 
segregated . . . clubs—the Ramada Club, the Houston Club, and the River Oaks 
Country Club.117 
The site of Fisher’s conference, the Carrousel Motor Hotel, was a 
physical embodiment of this tension between Houston’s public, 
sociopolitical gestures towards diversity and its private, psychological 
preference for homogeneity. The Carrousel board of directors had 
acquiesced to the new citywide policy of integration, but established a 
private dining club whose bylaws prohibited integrated service within the 
public hotel.118 This Brass Ring Club had “separate and distinct ownership” 
from the hotel, and its own board of directors.119 However, the same 
individual served as vice president of the hotel and president of the club.120 
Further, the club had no paid employees; instead, the hotel “furnish[ed] the 
labor and the service, the waiters, and they furnish[ed] the food.”121 In other 
words, the Brass Ring appears to have been a “club” in name only. The sole 
purpose of operating the “private” Brass Ring within the “public” Carrousel 
was seemingly to legitimize the exclusion of Black diners like Fisher. 
D. The Jury 
Although trial records contain no personal information about the jurors 
empaneled to hear Fisher’s case, educated guesswork suggests it was largely, 
if not entirely, white. At that time, Black people constituted just 20% of the 
Harris County population, and thus just one-fifth of the venire from which 
 
 117 MARY BETH ROGERS, BARBARA JORDAN: AMERICAN HERO 94 (1998). The commercial sector’s 
voluntary desegregation of select venues was reinforced less than a year later by Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which compelled the integration of public accommodations throughout the country. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)–(b) (2018) (signed into law on July 2, 1964). 
 118 Trial Transcript at 32, Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Harris County Dist. Ct. No. 635699 (June 
14, 1966). 
 119 Id. at 33. 
 120 Id. at 30. 
 121 Id. at 34. A selective membership process, limited number of admitted members, and material 
entry fee have been identified by courts interpreting the “private club” exception to the Civil Rights Act 
as indicia of bona fide membership clubs not governed by the Act. Institutions that claim club status but 
lack these characteristics have been denominated “sham” clubs. See Margaret E. Koppen, The Private 
Club Exemption from Civil Rights Legislation—Sanctioned Discrimination or Justified Protection of 
Right to Associate?, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 643, 654–64 (1993). 
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the jury commissioner could draw candidates for service.122 Consequently, 
assuming that the jury seated in Fisher’s case was perfectly representative of 
the local community, it is likely that at least nine of its members were white. 
And it is reasonable to assume that the jury seated was not perfectly 
representative of that community, as court administrators and attorneys had 
for years (both purposefully and inadvertently) adopted practices that 
reduced the number of minorities in the at-large jury pool and in actual seated 
juries.123 
In short, the jury was drawn from a community that had intentionally 
and stubbornly refused to integrate schools despite an emphatic public law 
directive to do so. This same community appeared to go along with 
integration of low-status venues such as lunch counters and movie theaters 
only because they could take refuge from diversity in established white-only 
social and business clubs. And they created sham clubs like the Brass Ring 
for the express purpose of maintaining a racial divide in spaces where no 
such bona fide private institution existed. Put simply, the pervasive 
segregation in 1966 Houston makes it unlikely that white jurors went into 
Fisher’s trial primed to vindicate a claim that his public right to equality had 
been undone by private bias. 
E. The Silent Yielding 
Given the reality of White Houston in 1966, one suspects that the jurors 
who convened to hear Emmit Fisher’s case brought with them knowledge 
structures that had “naturalize[d] . . . racial ordering” and produced the kind 
of “non-racist racism” that eludes moral accountability.124 Nevertheless, at 
the end of the trial, they awarded Fisher $400 in compensatory damages and 
$500 in punitive damages.125 What explains this counterintuitive result? 
 It seems that the trial may have produced some measure of 
psychological transformation among the jurors. It did so by replicating, in a 
 
 122 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUSES OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: 1960, 15 (1960), 
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1960/population-and-housing-phc-1/419536
54v4ch4.pdf [https://perma.cc/G27T-YGLP]. 
 123 Although the Civil Rights Act of 1875 prohibited race-based exclusion from jury service, and the 
1880 Supreme Court case Strauder v. West Virginia invalidated a state law keeping Black people off of 
juries, states adopted evasive measures to discourage diverse juries. 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880); see, e.g., 
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING 
LEGACY 9–10 (2010). And even when the juror pool was diverse, it remained common practice for 
attorneys in the South to use selection tactics that excluded Black people. The Supreme Court was asked 
to repudiate these tactics in 1965 but did not fully do so until 1986. See id. at 12 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202 (1965); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
 124 Jungkunz & White, supra note 53, at 436, 441 (internal quotation marks omitted); Negro Wins 
$900 Award from Court, supra note 97. 
 125 Negro Wins $900 Award from Court, supra note 97. 
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state-sponsored forum, precisely the dynamic that political scientists Vincent 
Jungkunz and Julie White have advocated to confront white apathy and 
denial.126 
Emmit Fisher was a paradigmatic storyteller. He testified at length and 
from a distinct moral vantage point about his experience at the Brass Ring, 
telling the jury that “[he] was highly embarrassed [when] [e]verybody 
focused their attention right on [him] and they started mumbling.”127 When 
the meeting host apologetically told Fisher that the club was not going to 
bend its policy, Fisher accepted his apology and said: “I will not cause your 
company any further embarrassment.”128 Fisher then testified:  
I left the Brass Ring Club. I went back to the room where the meeting was, and 
I waited about forty-five minutes until the rest of them came back . . . I didn’t 
eat at all that day . . . . I can’t say that I was too hungry after that. I didn’t desire 
food.129 
The jurors’ political obligation on the day of the trial was to listen to 
Fisher. They were prohibited from posing questions, contesting his account, 
or making speeches, as white Americans are often given to doing in other 
political contexts.130 Instead, they were confined to the jury box, and for an 
entire day were compelled to train their attention on a Black-centered 
account of the world, not transmitted via categorical summaries or statistics, 
but narrated by Emmit Fisher himself. They spent additional time in the jury 
room, reflecting on Fisher’s story. At the close of this process, they accepted 
the realness of his wound at the hands of White Houston. They then exercised 
moral accountability by issuing a verdict meant to make him whole and 
punish the club manager.131 One might say that the trial changed their hearts. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern public lawyers seem to doubt that a body of law devoted to 
resolving one-on-one disputes about yesterday’s fractures can power social 
change. Professor Marshall Shapo has never been plagued by this doubt. 
While he has lauded public law for taking on the campaign against “misuses 
 
 126 See supra notes 54–69 and accompanying text. 
 127 Trial Transcript at 7, Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Harris County Dist. Ct. No. 635699 (June 
14, 1966). 
 128 Id. at 9. 
 129 Id. at 9–10. 
 130 See supra notes 71–72. 
 131 See Judgment, Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Harris County Dist. Ct. No. 635699 (June 14, 
1966). The Texas Supreme Court upheld the jury award and redefined the manager’s conduct as a battery, 
observing that “[p]ersonal indignity is the essence of an action for battery.” Fisher v. Carrousel Motor 
Hotel, 424 S.W.2d 627, 629–31 (Tex. 1967). 
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of power,” he has quietly insisted over the course of decades that tort remains 
an indispensable response to “egregious examples of bias” like Fisher.132 He 
has been alive to the potential of tort because he has never seen it as the law 
of market efficiency or the law of moral philosophy, but rather as the law of 
“social cohesion.”133 Out of complacency, it brings us awareness; out of 
categories, it brings us people. Out of a conversation about the care owed 
between two human beings, tort brings us civic virtue. 
 
 132 Marshall S. Shapo, Millennial Torts, 33 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (1999). 
 133 Marshall S. Shapo, A Social Contract Tort, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1835, 1844 (1997). 
